Abstract. We introduce a new abstract system, called the truth system. In the truth system, a process deduces a true value, with high probability, from an incoming stream of both true and false values, where the probability that a value in the incoming stream is true is at least 0.6. At each instant, the receiving process maintains at most one candidate of the true value, and eventually the process reaches the conclusion that its candidate value equals, with high probability, the true value. In this paper, we present three versions of the truth system, discuss their properties, and show how to choose their parameters so that their probability of error is small, i.e. about 10 −6 . The third version, called the stable system, is the most valuable. We employ the stable system as a building block in a stabilizing unidirectional token ring of n processes. When n is small, i.e. about 100 or less, the stable system can be considered errorfree and we argue that the resulting token ring is stabilizing with high probability. We simulate the token ring, when n is at most 100, and observe that the ring always stabilizes even though each process lies about its state 40% of the time.
Introduction
Faults, that are often assumed to plague the communications between different processes in a distributed system, can be distinguished into natural faults and malicious faults [7] . On one hand, natural communication faults are assumed to occur independently of the underlying computation of the distributed system, and are usually assumed to be random. On the other hand, malicious communication faults are assumed to occur in the worst possible times for the underlying computation of the distributed system, and are usually assumed to be deliberate and based on complete knowledge (by the adversary) of the underlying computation.
Distributed systems that tolerate natural communication faults are elegant, inexpensive, and practical to implement and use. However, such systems cannot Well-known examples of malicious communication faults and how to tolerate them are discussed in [10] and [12] .
In this paper, we present a new method, which we call the truth system, for tolerating modification faults. The truth system is different from the distributed voting systems, discussed in [13] and [11] , in several ways. Most notably, the two systems have different objectives. The objective of the truth system is to deduce, with a predefined high probability, the true value from an unbounded stream of both true and false values. In particular, the parameters of the truth system can be set such that the probability of the deduced value being wrong is very small, say 10 −6 . By contrast, the objective of a distributed voting system is to deduce the value that has the highest probability of being true from a bounded stream of both true and false values, but the probability of the deduced value being wrong can be as high as 0.5.
To save space, we omit the proofs of all theorems from this paper. An interested reader can get these proofs from the full version of the paper [8] .
Three Versions of the Truth System
The goal of this paper is to introduce a new abstract system, called the truth system, discuss its properties, and show that this system can tolerate, with high probability, modification faults. In the truth system, a process deduces a true value from a mixed stream of both true and false values. The probability, that a value in the mixed stream is true (or false), is at least 0.6 (or at most 0.4, respectively). The process correctly deduces the true value with a high probability, that is around (1-10 −6 ). It is important to explain why we chose the probability, of a value in the mixed stream being true, to be at least 0.6. First, if we chose this probability to be at most 0.5, then no system can deduce the true value with any probability greater than 0. Second, if we chose this probability to be higher than 0.5 but less than 0.6, then as shown at the end of Section 3 the truth system may need up to 1700 values in the input stream to deduce the true value. This is 10 times the number of values needed in the input stream, to deduce the true value, when the probability of a value in the mixed stream being true, is at least 0.6.
The truth system consists of two processes: source and monitor. Process source has an integer state, and process monitor attempts to correctly deduce the integer state of process source.
Periodically, process source sends an integer s to process monitor. With a probability of at least 0.6, the sent s is the true value of the state of process source, and with a probability of less than 0.4, the sent s is an arbitrary integer. Process monitor receives the s integers, one by one, and maintains at most one candidate for the state of process source. Eventually process monitor reaches the conclusion that its maintained candidate for the state of process source equals, with high probability, the true state of process source.
The state of process source can change over time, but we assume that this change occurs at a slow rate. This is because if the state of source is changed at a fast rate, the monitor process may never be able to catch up and deduce the state of source. As shown at the end of Section 3, to ensure that the change rate of the state of process source is slow, we assume that the state of source is not changed until process source has sent out this state 170 or more times.
Our presentation of the truth system in this paper consists of three steps. In each step, we present a version of the truth system and discuss its properties. We then point out some problem with this version and so clear the way for the next version that is to be presented in the next step, and so on. The version presented in the third (and last) step has no problems, as far as we can tell.
In the first step, we present a version of the truth system where the monitor process terminates as soon as it concludes that its maintained candidate for the state of process source equals, with high probability, the true state of process source. The problem of this truth system is that the monitor process deduces exactly one true state of process source, even if the state of process source is changed many times afterwards. We refer to this truth system as the one-shot system.
In the second step, we modify the one-shot system to make the monitor process continue to operate indefinitely, even after it concludes that its maintained candidate for the state of process source equals, with high probability, the true state of process source. We refer to this truth system as the continuing system. The problem with the continuing system is that the conclusion reached by process monitor (that its candidate for the state of process source equals, with high probability, the true state of source) is not stable, but it can fluctuate wildly over time, even when the true state of process source remains fixed for a long time period.
In the third step, we modify the continuing system to ensure that, when the true state of process source remains fixed for a long time period, the conclusion reached by process monitor (that its candidate for the state of process source equals, with high probability, the true state of source) remains stable over time. We refer to this truth system as the stable system.
The One-Shot System
In this section, we present our first version of the truth system, called the oneshot system. In the one-shot system, as soon as process monitor concludes, that its maintained candidate for the state of process source equals, with high probability, the true state of process source, process monitor terminates.
Process source in the one-shot system is specified in Protocol 1. This process has one action that it executes over and over, since the guard of the action is true. During each execution of the action, process source sends an integer s to process monitor. With probability p/100, the sent s is the value of input state, and with probability (100-p)/100, the sent s can be any integer, where p is an input of process source.
Input p can be regarded as the probability of process source telling the truth, and input state can be regarded as the true state of process source. From the received s integers, process monitor is expected to deduce the true value of input state in process source. It is straightforward to show that if the value of p is in the range 0..50, then process monitor can never deduce the true value of state. At the end of Section 3, we argue that if the value of p is in the range 51..59, then process monitor may need to receive up to 1700 s integers (instead of 170) in order to deduce the true value of state with high probability. That is why we specified the value of p to be in the range pmin..99, where pmin is a constant whose value is in the range 60..99. Both p and state are inputs to process source. Thus, their values can be changed over time by an outside agent. As shown at the end of Section 3, we assume that once the value of state is changed, the value of state remains fixed until process source executes its action 170 or more times.
Process monitor in the one-shot system is specified in Protocol 2. Process monitor has three variables: c, st and s. Variable c is a counter whose value is in the range 0..cmax, where cmax is a constant of process monitor. Variable st stores the latest candidate for the state of process source. Variable s stores the latest received integer from process source. The value of counter c indicates whether process monitor can conclude that the current value of st equals, with high probability, the value of state in process source. Process monitor reaches this conclusion when, and only when, the value of counter c is cmax.
Process monitor has only one action that is executed each time the process receives an integer s from process source. When an integer s is received, process monitor checks the value of its counter c. If c = 0, then variable st is assigned s and counter c is assigned 1. If c > 0 and st is different from the received s, then c is decreased by 1. If c > 0 and st equals the received s, then c is increased by 1 (provided that c does not exceed its maximum value cmax ). Then process monitor compares the values of c with cmax. If c = cmax, then process monitor concludes that the current value of its variable st equals, with high probability, the value of state in process source.
To complete the specification of process monitor, we need now to compute the value of constant cmax in monitor. The value of cmax should be chosen such that the probability of error of the one-shot system is kept small, say around 10 −6 . The probability of error, denoted p(error), of the one-shot system is the probability that starting from its initial global state where c = 0, the system reaches a global state where c = cmax and cs = state. In Theorem 1 below, we give a formula that describes the relationship between pmin, cmax, and p(error) for the one-shot system. Our proof of this theorem is based on two simplifying assumptions. First, we assume that the state of process source does not change over time. This assumption is acceptable given our understanding that the change rate of the state of process source is slow anyway. Second, we assume that whenever process source sends an arbitrary integer s to process monitor, process source always sends the same integer that is different from the state of process source. This assumption represents the worst case scenario that assigns p(error) its highest value. We adopt these two assumptions in proving all the theorems in this paper. (Recall that the proofs of all the theorems are in [8] .) Theorem 1 (pmin, cmax, and p(error) for the one-shot system)
For many applications, it is reasonable to expect that p(error) should be around 10 −6 . In this case, we can use the formula in Theorem 1 to produce the relationship between pmin and cmax, for the one-shot system, shown in Table 1 .
An execution step of the one-shot system consists of two parts. First, process source executes its (sending) action, then process monitor executes its (receiving) action.
If pmin in this system is 0.6 and the value of variable cs in process monitor is the correct state of process source, then in each step of the system, counter c in process monitor is incremented by 1 with probability 0.6, and is decremented by 1 with probability 0.4. In other words, each step of the system increments counter c by 0.2 on the average. Thus, the system needs to execute cmax/0.2 steps on the average before counter c reaches its maximum value cmax and the system terminates. Because cmax in this system is 34 from Table 1 , the system needs to execute 170 steps before it terminates.
If we choose pmin in this system to be 0.51, and assume that cmax remains 34 (rather than being increased in value as it should), and follow the same analysis in the previous paragraph, we conclude that the system will execute on average (34/0.02)= 1700 steps before it terminates. In other words, choosing pmin to be in the range from 0.51 to 0.59 can lead to (sometimes substantial) increase in the number of steps to be executed. This should explain our choice of pmin to be at least 0.6.
The above analysis for computing the average number of steps that need to be executed by the one-shot system before it terminates is based on the assumption that the state of process source does not change during execution. This is an important assumption; for instance, if the state is changed at least once every 5 execution steps, the one-shot system may never terminate. This should explain our above requirement that the state of process source remains fixed for the duration of 170 steps.
The Continuing System
The problem of the one-shot system is that process monitor terminates as soon as it concludes that the value of its cs variable equals, with high probability, the value of input state in process source. Thus, monitor cannot observe any change in the state of process source. To remedy this problem, we modify process monitor such that the process continues to execute indefinitely. This modification is achieved by replacing statement terminate by a statement skip in the action of process monitor. We refer to the resulting system as the continuing system.
Because the continuing system is nonterminating, the initial state of the system, where c = 0, is irrelevant. Rather, we define the probability of error p(error) of the continuing system as the steady state probability that the system is in a global state where c = cmax and cs = state. The following theorem gives a formula that describes the relationship between pmin, cmax, and p(error) for the continuing system.
Theorem 2 (pmin, cmax, and p(error) for the continuing system)
Assuming that p(error) is around 10 −6 , we can use the formula in Theorem 2 to produce the relationship between pmin and cmax, for the continuing system, shown in Table 2 . Notice that the cmax values in the one-shot system, shown in Table 1 , are twice the cmax values in the continuing system, shown in Table 2 .
The continuing system has an interesting problem. Even if the state of process source remains fixed for a long time period T, the value of counter c in process monitor can fluctuate during period T between c < cmax (when process monitor cannot conclude that cs = state) and c = cmax (when process monitor can conclude that cs = state). This observation suggests the following definition.
The probability of no conclusion, denoted p(no-conclusion), of the continuous system is the steady state probability that the system is in a global state where c < cmax. The following theorem gives a formula for computing p(no-conclusion) as a function of pmin and cmax.
Theorem 3 (p(no-conclusion) for the continuing system)
Using the formula in Theorem 3 and the values of pmin and cmax in Table 2 , we can compute the values of p(no-conclusion), for the continuing system, as shown in Table 2 .
From the first row in Table 2 , if pmin and cmax for the continuing system are 0.6 and 17 respectively, then p(no-conclusion) for this system is 0.667. This means that even if the state of process source remains fixed for a long time period T, process monitor cannot conclude that cs = state for 66.7% of the time during period T. Clearly, this is not acceptable and a modification of the continuing system is in order. In the next section, we describe how to modify the continuing system to remedy this problem. We refer to the modified system as the stable system. 
The Stable System
The stable system is obtained from the continuing system, discussed in the previous section, by making the following two modifications to process monitor (in the continuing system). First, a new variable named ss is added to process monitor. Variable ss stores the latest stable estimate (by process monitor) of the state of process source. Second, the last if -statement in the action of process monitor is modified to become as shown in Figure 1 . The probability of error p(error) of the stable system is defined as the steady state probability that the system is in a global state where ss = state. The following theorem describes the relationship between pmin, cmax, and p(error) for the stable system.
Theorem 4 (pmin, cmax, and p(error) for the stable system). Given that p(error) for the stable system is around 10
−6 , we have the following relationship between pmin and cmax for the stable system.
A step of the stable system consists of two parts. First, process source executes its action once. Second, process monitor executes its action once. The convergence span of the stable system is the average number of steps that needs to be executed by the stable system in order to change the global state of the system from one where c = cmax and ss = state to one where c = cmax and ss = state. The following theorem gives an approximate formula for computing the convergence span of the stable system.
Theorem 5 (convergence span of the stable system).
convergence span ≈ 2 × cmax 2 × pmin − 1 . Table 3 .
pmin cmax 0.6 20 0.7 9 0.8 5 0.9 4 Using the formula in this theorem and the values of pmin and cmax from Table 3 , we compute the convergence span of the stable system as shown in Table 4 .
A Stabilizing Token Ring
In this section, we discuss how to employ the stable system, presented in the previous section, as a building block in constructing a stabilizing unidirectional token ring of up to 100 processes, where each process can lie about its state at most 40% of the time. The use of the stable system as a building block in constructing a stabilizing token ring, (where each process can lie about its state at most 40% of the time) can be roughly viewed as an example of the cross-over composition proposed in [2] .
We start our discussion by presenting a unidirectional token ring, in Protocol 3, where processes do not lie about their states. Note that this ring is similar to Dijkstra's token ring in [4] with two exceptions. First, the execution of this ring is synchronous, whereas the execution of Dijkstra's token ring is asynchronous. Second, this ring uses message passing primitives whereas Dijkstra's token ring uses shared memory primitives. A transition of this ring is a pair (S, S') of global states of the ring such that if the ring is in a global state S and a "step" is executed, then the ring becomes in a global state S'. Executing a step in the ring consists of two parts. First, each process in the ring executes its sending action, then each process in the ring executes its receiving action. Thus, each process in the ring ends up executing both its (sending and receiving) actions in a step.
A computation of this ring is an infinite sequence S.0, S.1, ... of global states of the ring such that each pair (S.i, S.(i+1)) of consecutive states in the sequence is a transition of the ring.
It is straightforward to show that each computation of this ring reaches a legitimate global state where the values of all the ss variables are equal after at most 2n transitions, and so this ring is stabilizing.
Clearly, stabilization of the ring in Protocol 3 depends heavily on the fact that the ring processes do not lie when they send their states to other processes. A transition of the new ring is a pair (S, S') of the global states of the new ring such that if the ring is in a global state S and a "step" is executed, then the ring becomes in a global state S'. Executing a step in the new ring consists of two parts. First, each process in the ring executes its sending (or source) action. Second, each process in the ring executes its receiving (or monitor) action.
A computation of the new ring is an infinite sequence S.0, S.1, ... of global states of the ring such that each pair (S.i, S.(i+1)) of consecutive states in the sequence is a transition of the new ring.
The new ring can be viewed as consisting of n stable systems, and each ss variable in the ring can be viewed as belonging to the monitor of one of those stable systems. For the new ring to stabilize, if it is to stabilize, each ss variable needs to be assigned around 2×n new values. From Table 4 and given that pmin is 0.6, a stable system needs to execute on average 200 steps in order to assign a new value to its ss variable. Therefore, for the new ring to stabilize, if it is to the global state S.40000 in this computation is a legitimate state, with high probability. Therefore, the new ring is stabilizing, with high probability.
The probabilistic stabilization of the new ring depends heavily on the validity of the no-use-lying assumption. To check the validity of this assumption, we have run 100 simulations of the new ring. For each simulation, we chose n (the number of processes in the ring) to be 100, the initial global state of the ring to be random, and the wrong state that each process sends in place of its correct state to be 0. We observed that each simulation has stabilized to a legitimate global state, after no more than 32440 transitions. These simulation results justify our adoption of the no-use-lying assumption.
A probabilistic token ring is proposed in [5] . This ring is significantly different from our new token ring in Protocol 4 in the following sense. In the probabilistic ring in [5] 
Concluding Remarks
The truth system is a building block that can be employed in a distributed system to ensure that the system performs its intended function, with high probability, even if up to 40% of the sent values by each process in the system are completely arbitrary. In this paper, we presented three versions of the truth system: the oneshot system, the continuing system, and the stable system. We also compared the properties of these three versions and concluded that the stable system is superior to the other two. Finally we showed how to employ the stable system in a unidirectional token ring so that the ring performs its intended function even if up to 40% of the values sent by each process in the ring are arbitrary. This paper suggests a number of interesting problems that merit further research. First, are there interesting versions of the truth system other than those discussed in this paper? Second, are there algorithms that take a distributed system that performs a function f under the assumption of perfect communication and produce a distributed system that employs a version of the truth system as a building block and performs function f, with high probability, under the assumption that up to 40% of the values sent by each process in the system are arbitrary. Third, are there effective methods to compute the probability of error and the convergence span for a distributed system where a version of the truth system is employed as a building block? any self-stabilization paper that uses Dijkstra's token ring as an example, and who accepted our paper nonetheless. We appreciate your tolerance!
